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The model we’re following is totally inappropriate in the sense that... because the 
amount we fund is so small, it becomes a case of ‘political Smarties’ rather than 
effective use of resources. Who gets the money in the end is either a lotto or a case 
of political connections. 
Provincial agriculture manager, Eastern Cape, 2009: pers. comm. 
Abstract 
This paper summarises what is known about South Africa’s public expenditure trends in 
respect of small-scale farmers, and discusses the growing contradictions between the policy 
priority placed on small-scale farming and the adequacy of support provided to small-scale 
farmers. It then proceeds to argue that: i) dramatic increases in public expenditure support 
to small-scale agriculture are highly unlikely, while further incremental increases to support 
the sector will in themselves make little difference; ii) a lot of the money already available 
to support small-scale agriculture is not well spent, with a particular imbalance evident 
between relatively large amounts of support to badly conceptualised land reform projects at 
the expense of black farmers in the ex-Bantustans; iii) there is an urgent need to shift the 
emphasis of support from on-farm infrastructure and inputs, to community-level 
infrastructure, market development and institutional re-engineering. 
1. Introduction 
‘Small-scale farmers’ in South Africa have been subject to years of official neglect, despite 
numerous policies and programmes that proclaim the opposite. In particular, dismantling 
Bantustan agricultural development corporations (for all their faults) in the 1990s left a 
vacuum in production and marketing support for the now-estimated 200,000 commercially-
oriented smallholder farmers and 2.5 million households practicing agriculture mainly for 
subsistence purposes (Aliber and Hall 2010). At precisely the same time the elaborate 
architecture of regulation and subsidies for white commercial farmers was rapidly 
dismantled. Just following this process, the past decade, and particularly the past five years 
or so, has seen the growth of budgets to provide direct support to black and disadvantaged 
farmers in the form of grants for infrastructure, production inputs and other items, and 
recently through an extension service ‘recovery programme’. Yet evidence shows that most 
black farming households receive little if any support, largely because available resources 
are highly skewed towards certain farmers over others.  
 
The needs and interests of small farmers, however, have climbed the political agenda in 
recent years, attracting new policy emphasis. Shifts in the ruling tripartite alliance have 
contributed to more left-leaning and pro-poor policy pronouncements in a number of 
spheres, particularly in a newfound priority placed on rural development, which became a 
ministerial portfolio for the first time in the Zuma administration in 2009. ‘Rural 
development, food security and land reform’ was one of the five priority areas listed in the 
ANC’s election manifesto of 2009, which also committed the party to address food security 
and to ‘[E]xpand access to food production schemes in rural and peri-urban areas to grow 
their own food with implements, tractors, fertilizers and pesticides’ (ANC 2009). Under the 
heading rural development, the manifesto declared: 
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The ANC government will: Intensify the land reform programme to ensure that 
more land is in the hands of the rural poor and will provide them with technical 
skills and financial resources to productively use the land to create sustainable 
livelihoods and decent work in rural areas. ... [And] expand [the] agrarian reform 
programme, which will focus on the systematic promotion of agricultural co-
operatives throughout the value chain, including agro-processing in the 
agricultural areas. Government will develop support measures to ensure more 
access to markets and finance by small farmers, including fencing and irrigation 
systems. 
ANC 2009 
At Polokwane, the ANC adopted wide-ranging resolutions on ‘rural development, land 
reform, and agrarian change’, which set a new tone for the party’s focus on rural poverty 
and agriculture. The resolution included a commitment to implement ‘the Freedom 
Charter’s call to help those working the land with implements, seed, tractors, infrastructure 
for irrigation and other forms of material support’ and ‘large-scale programmes to establish 
new smallholders and improve the productivity of existing small-scale and subsistence 
farmers, and to integrate smallholders into formal value chains and link them with markets’ 
(ANC 2007). It noted that: 
Our programmes of rural development, land reform and agrarian change must be 
integrated into a clear strategy that seeks to empower the poor, particularly those 
who already derive all or part of their livelihoods from the exploitation of 
productive land. In line with the Freedom Charter’s call that ‘the land shall be 
shared among those who work it’, the critical beneficiaries of change must be rural 
women, farm-dwellers, household producers in former Bantustans, small 
businesses and rural entrepreneurs and residents of urban and peri-urban areas 
that wish to engage in agricultural livelihoods. 
ANC 2007 
Along with improved services and infrastructure, and strengthened implementation of laws 
in support of farm dwellers, two of the four pillars of the new programme would be: 
(b) Fundamental changes in the patterns of land ownership through the 
redistribution of 30% of agricultural land before 2014. This must include 
comprehensive support programmes with proper monitoring mechanisms to 
ensure sustainable improvements in livelihoods for the rural poor, farm workers, 
farm-dwellers and small farmers, especially women. 
(c) Agrarian change with a view to supporting subsistence food production, 
expanding the role and productivity of modern smallholder farming and 
maintaining a vibrant and competitive agricultural sector. 
ANC 2007 
However, dramatic increases in budget allocations to agriculture over the past five years 
have made little dent in the chronic problem of under-investment in small-scale (i.e. black) 
agriculture in South Africa. This is because of huge numbers of people engaged in 
agriculture, mostly on a small-scale, often part-time, and largely with little or no interaction 
with the official programmes ostensibly there to help them. The still largely white 
commercial sector also gets little support. Rather, the dearth of support for small-scale 
farmers is the product of funnelling available resources to ‘emerging’ and ‘commercialising’ 
small- and medium-scale black farmers. This strategy of ‘picking winners’ coincides to a large 
degree with the focus on beneficiaries of one particular land reform programme that was 
initially designed for precisely the purpose of creating a black commercial farming class: the 
Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme.  
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This paper reviews overall trends in budget allocations in support of small-scale farmers in 
South Africa. It analyses a key government programme — the Comprehensive Agricultural 
Support Programme (CASP) — and provides an initial assessment of spending priorities in 
this programme, using some national data and data from interviews with implementers in 
the two provinces with the largest number of small farmers: Eastern Cape and Limpopo. 
2. Trends in public budgeting 
and expenditure 
Despite the occasional wobble, the amount of money spent by government on the 
agricultural sector has grown impressively since the mid-1990s. Figure 1 illustrates this in two 
ways. First, using data from the statistical annex to Treasury’s annual Budget Review, it 
shows the consolidated national and provincial expenditure on ‘agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries’, but with land reform expenditure/budgets subtracted (this is the higher series in 
blue with diamond markers). To the left of the vertical line, the data points represent 
expenditure (though for 2008/9 this was still an estimate), while to the right they represent 
the medium term budget estimates. The data have been adjusted for inflation (and for 
future years for anticipated inflation) using the consumer price index, thus the upward 
trend is real: between 1996/7 and 2008/9, expenditure nearly trebled. 
 
Notwithstanding the dip between 2008/9 and 2009/10 — which is all the more surprising 
given the greater emphasis placed on rural development by the ANC government since the 
last elections — and bearing in mind that the project increase from 2009/10 to 2010/11 may 
not take place, the increase is still significant. Having said that, in 2008/9 the government 
only budgeted 2.3% of the total budget for agriculture; this falls far short of the African 
Union’s Maputo Protocol benchmark of 10% (though this benchmark may be less applicable 
to South Africa, where agriculture represents less than 4% of GDP, than to other African 
countries like Mozambique (where it accounts for 26%) or Malawi (39%).  
 
The second series in Figure 1 (in red with square markers) shows provincial agricultural 
expenditure only. The difference between the two series is partly because the consolidated 
series includes expenditure by the national Department of Agriculture; however, it also 
includes the Agricultural Research Council and other national-level parastatals, as well as 
expenditure on fisheries and forestry. Although this provincial series is quite a bit lower, its 
growth has still been substantial: between 1996/7 and 2008/9, expenditure rose by almost 
exactly a factor of three.  
 
However, although these are certainly significant increases, are these expenditure levels ‘a 
lot’? 
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Figure 1: Agricultural sector expenditure/budgets (2008 Rand) 
 
Sources:  National Treasury (various) and National Treasury 2009b. 
One way to try to gain perspective on the size of these expenditure levels is to simply divide 
them by the number of agriculturalists. Given that there is little direct support to white 
commercial agriculture, we focus on the number of black farming households, which we 
estimate from Stats SA’s Labour Force Survey. In Figure 2, the higher, blue line traces the 
per-household expenditure/budget based on the full-consolidated budget for agriculture, 
forestry, and fisheries, while the lower, red series does the same for the provincial 
agriculture spending. Using the first measure, the per-household expenditure in 2008/09 
was about R5700; by the second measure, it was R2200. For the first measure, the increase 
between 2001/2 and 2008/9 was 71%, while for the second, it was 46%.  
Figure 2: Agricultural sector expenditure/budgets per black farming household (2008 
Rand) 
Sources: National Treasury (various), National Treasury 2009b and Stats SA (various). 
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Given that, as of 2008, there were almost 2.7 million black farming households, this is no 
small achievement. Moreover, given that most black farming households practice 
subsistence farming, a per-household expenditure of a few thousand Rand seems 
reasonable; it is more than most such households spend on inputs in a typical year, but not 
extravagantly more.  
 
However, what do we know about the actual distribution of this expenditure among 
farmers? We attempt to address this question in two ways, first in terms of the provincial 
disaggregation of expenditure, and second in terms of estimates as to numbers of farmers 
deriving direct benefits. 
 
In terms of the provincial distribution of agricultural expenditure, the results are perhaps 
surprisingly equitable. Figure 3 presents the average annual expenditure per black farming 
household, by province, for the two periods 2001/2 through 2004/5, and 2005/6 through 
2008/9. The figure shows that the average annual expenditure is remarkably even across 
provinces, with the obvious exceptions of Northern Cape and Western Cape, and the 
somewhat less obvious exception of North West. As for changes between the two periods, 
all provinces except Gauteng experienced an improvement, though oddly it was Northern 
Cape and Western Cape again that experienced the most significant improvements. The 
apparent inequity should not be exaggerated; Northern and Western Cape have relatively 
small numbers of black farming households, and together account for only 10% of the total 
provincial expenditure for the second period. What this reveals above all is a job well done, 
in the sense that the distribution of expenditure for the most part mirrors the distribution 
of black farming households, which are overwhelmingly concentrated in Eastern Cape 
(26%), Limpopo (24%) and KwaZulu-Natal (21%). 
Figure 3: Agricultural sector expenditure/budgets per black farming household, by 
province (2008 Rand) 
 
Sources: National Treasury 2009b and Stats SA (various). 
However, a different picture emerges if we look in a little more depth as to what kinds of 
activities these budgets finance, and who is enjoying their benefits. Agricultural spending 
takes many forms, including extension services, infrastructure development through the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP), loans through the Micro 
Agricultural Financial Institutional Scheme of South Africa (MAFISA), and even research. 
Taking together extension, CASP, and MAFISA, there is reason for concern. Firstly, averaging 
The Case for Re-Strategising Spending Priorities to Support Small-Scale Farmers in South Africa 
 8 
over the period 2005/6 t0 2008/9, these three interventions collectively absorb about 58% of 
total provincial expenditure.1
    
 However, from official delivery statistics, we know that during 
that four year period, there was an annual average of about 61,000 beneficiaries of CASP 
(most of whom were land reform beneficiaries, as we will discuss in more detail below), and 
about 2,500 loan recipients via MAFISA. As for the numbers of those benefitting from 
extension services, we have no recent data. The best indicator on offer is from Stats SA’s 
1997 Rural Survey, which found that among those engaged in farming in the former 
homelands, only 11% had had contact with an extension officer in the previous twelve 
months (Stats SA 1998). Given that the total number of extension officers in the country 
now is not very different to what it was then, we speculate that the share of black farming 
households receiving attention from extension staff is not very different today (and we have 
vast anecdotal evidence from around the country to back this up). 
This means that, in a given year, at most 13% of black farming households derive direct 
benefits from the 58% of the provincial spending made up from these three interventions.2
 
 
While we must allow for the possibility that many farmers may derive indirect or passive 
benefits, and also acknowledge that for CASP-funded infrastructure development in 
particular, the benefits should be enduring and thus not measured strictly on a per annum 
basis, it still gives cause for concern. Taking for example the R5.9 billion of provincial 
expenditure in 2008/9: this could be taken to mean that about 350,000 black farming 
households benefitted from expenditure in the order of R17 000 each, while most of the 
other 2.3 million black households received benefits close to zero. 
The biggest worry arguably is extension, as it already accounts for such a large share of 
provincial expenditure (not less than 50%). How much larger would the extension service 
have to be to make an appreciable difference, i.e. to reach a significant number of black 
farmers.3
 
 And what would be the budget implications of a significantly larger and better 
extension service? Herein lies one of the key themes of this paper: to the extent that fairly 
significant amounts of money are already being spent in the agricultural sector, and to the 
extent it is manifestly inadequate, where is there meaningful room for improvement? 
                                            
1 This is using ‘compensation of employees’ as an approximation for the cost of extension 
services. As for the other 42% of provincial expenditure, more than two thirds is ‘goods and 
services’, which is a form of current expenditure. What precisely this consists of is unclear, 
though presumably it covers transport costs of extension staff, office space, and so on. 
National Treasury’s Provincial Budgets and Expenditure Review: 2005/06–2011/12 merely says 
of ‘goods and services’ that they “…are key to increasing agricultural productivity” 
(National Treasury, 2009b:118).   
2 Assuming that, for example, beneficiaries of CASP are not also beneficiaries of extension 
support, which in general is not the case. 
3 Obviously, this is to say nothing about the quality of the current extension corps, which has 
been the focus of much concern in government in recent years (NDA 2008b). 
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3. The Comprehensive 
Agricultural Support 
Programme 
The Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) was launched in 2004 with 
funds for disbursement to farming households. While clearly not the only or largest form of 
agricultural support, it is the most significant capital budget line potentially available to 
small-scale black farmers. CASP originated from the 2003 intergovernmental fiscal review of 
agriculture — conducted by Treasury together with the Minister and MECs4
 
 — which found 
that agriculture was under-funded, and in particular experienced a gap in capital funding, 
as 80% of total funding went on salaries. When CASP was created, there was a decision to 
keep it with the national department, rather than making it part of the equitable share to 
provinces, in order to ringfence the funding from other priorities (NDA 2007b). Therefore, 
although provincial departments implement it, they account directly to the national 
department on their expenditure on a quarterly basis, and submit province-level funding 
proposals for approval by the national department and minister.  
The stated aim of CASP is ‘[to] expand the provision of support services, to promote and 
facilitate agricultural development targeting beneficiaries of the Land Reform and other 
Agrarian Reform programmes’ (NDA 2007a). Initially conceived as a conditional grant 
targeting beneficiaries of land reform, CASP guidelines require that 70% of funds go to land 
reform beneficiaries and the remaining 30% to ‘other agrarian reform beneficiaries’, i.e. 
those who already have some access to land, most likely people already living and farming 
at some scale in communal areas of the former Bantustans (NDA 2007a). So, while it is 
intended to address a wide variety of needs, in the views of many — especially officials and 
senior managers in the Department of Agriculture — it is essentially the ‘agriculture’ side of 
land reform. As Sam Malatji, then the department’s National Chief Director of Land 
Development Services, observed at the national meeting to review the programme in 2007, 
‘CASP is the “AD” [agricultural development] in LRAD’ (Malatji 2007: pers. comm.). 
 
The six ‘pillars’ of CASP for which funds may be made available are on and off-farm 
infrastructure; information and knowledge management; training and capacity building; 
technical and advisory services; financing mechanisms; and marketing and business 
development. The only guide as to the weighting of these is that 10% of CASP funds should 
go for household food production, 5% for animal health, and 10% for education, 
mentorship, and training (NDA 2007a). 
 
CASP started with a total budget of R750 million for the first three years, escalating from 
R200m in the first year of 2004/5, rising the following year to R250m and then to R300m in 
2006/07, after which it continued to rise more dramatically. 
                                            
4 Ministers of the Executive Committee, i.e. provincial ministers, in this case, of agriculture. 
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Table 1: CASP budget allocations, projects and beneficiaries, 2004/5 to 2009/10 
Year Budget (R million)  % spent Projects Beneficiaries 
2004/5 200 62% 510 46 500 
2005/6 250 63% 1070 53 200 
2006/7 300 84% 870 67 400 
2007/8 415 85% 786 60 300 
2008/9 535 90% 703 31 039 
2009/10* 715   35 000 
2010/11* 862   32 000 
2011/12* 979   32 000 
Sources: DAFF 2009 and from National Treasury 2009a 
* Figures for 2009/10-2010/11 are projections. 
Allocations from the national department to each provincial department vary widely, 
supposedly based on the number of land and agrarian reform beneficiaries/projects, the 
‘ruralness of the province’, the size of agricultural land and arable land, and population size 
(NDA 2007a). In practice, CASP forms part of a wider effort to provide Farmer Support, of 
which the most significant element (as noted above) is extension services (National Treasury 
2009b). In many provinces, in fact, CASP constitutes a fairly small proportion of the overall 
budget available. Table 2 shows the relatively low significance of CASP compared to the 
overall provincial spending on Farmer Support in provinces like Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal 
and the Eastern Cape in 2008/9. 
Table 2: CASP budgets by province and as a % of Farmer Support budgets, 2008/9  
Province Farmer Support 
(in R million) 
CASP* 
(in R million) 
CASP as % of Farmer 
Support 
Eastern Cape 511               90  18% 
Free State 99               49  50% 
Gauteng 71               25  36% 
KwaZulu-Natal 646               88  14% 
Limpopo 613               81  13% 
Mpumalanga 350               53  15% 
Northern Cape 72               37  51% 
North West 150               68  46% 
Western Cape 109               43  40% 
TOTAL 2622            535  20% 
Sources: National Treasury 2009b and DAFF 2009 
*CASP figures are allocations, not actual expenditures; for 2008/9, under-expenditure relative to 
allocations was 12% nationally, with a low of 0% for Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Western Cape, and a 
high of 29% for Western Cape.  
In the first two years of CASP, about 63% of the allocation was spent (see Table 1). A degree 
of under-spending continued in the first few years and, despite being unable to disburse all 
the funds, provinces pushed for higher allocations, arguing that land reform was moving 
ahead and that many beneficiaries were not getting CASP support.  
Provinces claim that existing farmer support budgets are too small to meet all of 
these needs. In the context of under-spending (although the situation is 
improving) this position seems hard to justify. Although the demand/need for 
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support in provinces is not contested, given that CASP in many instances only 
represents a small proportion of total farmers support budgets, the question of 
what the remaining farmer support budgets in the provinces are being used for 
needs to be answered first. Where it can be demonstrated that farmer support 
budgets are indeed inadequate, and where capacity to effectively implement 
exists, addition to farmer support budgets should be considered. 
NDA 2007b: 1 
The first review of CASP, conducted nationally in 2007, concluded that contrary to its name, 
CASP was not comprehensive either in its reach nor in the types of support provided. In both 
respects, it was far from comprehensive, and rather there were substantial barriers to access, 
prioritisation was unclear and inconsistent across provinces, usually with no clear rationale 
for prioritising one type of applicant over another. Even though there were six ‘pillars’ or 
focus areas for the kinds of support to be provided under the programme, in practice 
support forthcoming was almost entirely restricted to on-farm infrastructure, with other 
components not adequately explained to farmers. The review found that all provinces 
prioritised on-farm infrastructure over the other pillars of CASP, a pattern which the review 
deemed appropriate in some cases (like the Northern Cape — presumably because of the 
importance of fencing and water points for grazing) and inappropriate in others (like the 
Free State and Gauteng) (NDA 2007b). With respect to the Eastern Cape, the Review noted 
that CASP had only focused on on-farm infrastructure and that ‘the other pillars of CASP do 
not really feature in the province’ (NDA 2007b:10). 
In all of the projects visited CASP has delivered infrastructure ranging from 
fencing, boreholes, watering points, irrigation infrastructure, livestock handling 
facilities, and structures such as packing sheds. Although appreciative of the 
infrastructure delivered (bar some concerns regarding quality), the needs of 
farmers are more comprehensive. As in other provinces, though there is a call for a 
wider basket of services to be made available through CASP. 
NDA 2007b:10 
The CASP review found that implementation was characterised by fragmented planning, a 
backlog of SLAG and LRAD projects awaiting CASP funds, separate approval mechanisms for 
land acquisition and agricultural support, complicated procurement procedures, and 
inadequate capacity and access to information (presumably among both potential 
beneficiaries and the officials administering the programme) (NDA 2007a). It concluded 
that, underlying these were two major problems. The first was one of programme 
administration, specifically the ‘lengthy and bureaucratic planning and budgeting process 
which mitigates against prompt and timeous service delivery’, compounded by cumbersome 
procurement processes (NDA 2007b:1). The second was programme access, which as the 
Review noted, was a ‘mixed picture’: 
Many of the current beneficiaries were not centrally involved in the application 
process — much of this was done for beneficiaries by agriculture (or in some cases 
land affairs) staff. For those outside of the programme the issues [sic] was more 
problematic. Although many had heard of CASP, many were unaware of how one 
gained access to it. There was confusion among farmers as to what CASP is. Many, 
who are not land reform beneficiaries, require broader and general agricultural 
support services. 
NDA 2007b:1 
The CASP review noted the variable practices across provinces in terms of who is prioritised 
— appearing to favour the allocation of most CASP funds to land reform projects rather 
than other farmers, implying that other farmer support funds should go to non-land reform 
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beneficiaries, and noting a danger that land reform would be crowded out by the sheer 
scale of the needs of existing farmers in communal areas.  
At present, in some provinces the predominant focus is on land reform, but in 
others this interpretation is challenged, and without controls there is a tendency 
for CASP monies to slip toward those. It is critical that a common understanding of 
who CASP is targeted at and why is ingrained in the programme. There is a real 
danger that CASP will simply become a hold-all programme addressing needs that 
should actually be dealt with through broader provincial farmer support budgets. 
NDA 2007b:2 
The review found that there were major problems with bureaucratically determined 
processes of planning, approval, and procurement, in that these are at odds with the cyclical 
nature of agriculture. It also found that the focus of CASP was heavily contested in some 
provinces — for instance, what weight should be given to land reform beneficiaries versus 
other black farmers (both poor semi-subsistence farmers in the communal areas, and 
‘emerging’ or commercialising black farmers). 
4. The absence of strategy: 
Disbursement practices in 
CASP 
National project data for CASP allocations in 2009/10 (kindly provided by the National 
Department of Agriculture for the purpose of this analysis) show great variation both 
between and within provinces. Funding per project ranges from R20,000 (for irrigation 
infrastructure) to R5.4 million (for a poultry house) and, in addition, a high proportion of 
projects benefit more than once — e.g. receiving funds in two or three consecutive years.  
 
Allocation of CASP funds is highly skewed to a small proportion of beneficiaries. Analysis of 
the national data shows that, among the 322 projects funded in 2009 for which beneficiary 
data is available, 79.8% of CASP expenditure goes to 20% of the beneficiaries, or worse, 
50.7% goes to 2.6% of the beneficiaries. Given that those receiving CASP support in 2009, 
account for less than one percent of small-scale farmers, this suggests that the lion’s share of 
state funding for small-scale farmers goes to less than 0.02% of them. 
 
Further, the variation is astonishing between the provinces, with Mpumalanga, the 
Northern Cape and the North West having far fewer projects than the other provinces — 
even when taking into account that the allocations to these provinces are low compared to 
the other provinces (with the exception of Gauteng). While a smaller number of projects 
does not necessarily indicate that fewer people are being assisted, in some instances it 
seems this is the case. 
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Table 3: CASP allocations for 2009/10 by province 
Province Number of projects Total allocation 
(in R’000) 
% of total 
allocation 
Eastern Cape 110 149,268 22 
Free State 127 65,659 10 
Gauteng 154 24,734 4 
KwaZulu-Natal 197 94,487 14 
Limpopo 156 108,453 16 
Mpumalanga 22 55,504 8 
Northern Cape 17 36,451 5 
North West 51 91,518 13 
Western Cape 121 63,640 9 
TOTAL 955 689,714 100 
Source: NDA 2009 
Mpumalanga, Northern Cape and North West have on the whole fewer larger (i.e. more 
expensive) projects — though major projects are found in all provinces, even those like the 
Eastern Cape and Limpopo where a larger number of medium-sized projects are to be 
found. But there are also cases of very substantial transfers of funds to few people, in those 
provinces which report on numbers of beneficiaries per project (Eastern Cape, Limpopo and 
North West do not do so). For example a broiler house project in Mpumalanga, benefiting 
12 people, cost R10.8 million — the largest single project expenditure in the country in 2009. 
In the same province, a woman and a man (perhaps related to one another) were together 
allocated R497,000, also for a broiler house project, while in the Free State one woman got 
R270,000 to renovate her poultry houses. A large portion of projects in Gauteng are for one 
individual farmer, averaging about R200,000 each. These examples illustrate the 
permissiveness rather than directive nature of policy in this area — there is no requirement 
to demonstrate need, nor any prescribed rationale according to which those assessing 
applications (usually district screening committees) should decide how to distribute funds 
across competing and non-equivalent needs. It is unsurprising, then, that such widely 
divergent practices have emerged. 
 
Within provinces there are of course a variety of different kinds of projects, some of which 
involve major infrastructure, but most of which is ‘on-farm’ infrastructure rather than for 
instance shared infrastructure designed to serve the needs of a community of producers in a 
given area engaged in similar production. There are exceptions, like dipping tanks in 
communal areas in Limpopo and major irrigation infrastructure in the Eastern Cape, but by 
and large, infrastructure is limited to private on-farm infrastructure and, as a result, to 
privately owned land — and therefore to land reform projects rather than communal areas 
— a theme to which we now turn. 
4.1 Competing and unequal priorities: Land reform and 
communal areas 
 
In practice, a major reason why communal areas are largely excluded from CASP funding is 
the combination of three factors: the equation of CASP with ‘infrastructure’, the lack of 
secure tenure in communal areas on which to build this infrastructure, and the political 
priority attached to improving the perceived performance of land reform projects. In the 
absence of certainty about the land rights of beneficiaries — to own and control the 
infrastructure created with the CASP funds allocated to them — agricultural officials are 
somewhat at a loss of how to support farmers in these areas. Instead, ‘food security’ funds 
are channelled, to provide ‘starter packs’ of seed and implements.  
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The CASP manager for Limpopo explains that, without farmers having secure tenure rights 
on communal land, CASP cannot be provided for fixed infrastructure — though arguably 
the department is under no formal obligation to require such evidence to disburse funds. 
We move from a principle that says, in each district at least 75% of the CASP 
budget must go to land reform projects. We’ll still provide for the communal land, 
as long as the land tenure issues are clear. The normal PTO [permission to occupy 
certificate] is not legislated as such, and the tenure is not well documented, the 
chief just says that you are given a piece of land to do agriculture. So we have 
moved to discuss with chiefs, and we have come up with some kind of leases that 
talk to the exact size and extent of that piece of land, so in that way we are 
starting to move towards [providing CASP support on] communal land. 
Provincial CASP manager 2009: pers. comm. 
Similarly, in the Eastern Cape implementers are concerned that most small black farmers 
cannot access CASP support because of the priority placed on land reform (i.e. projects 
outside the communal areas) and on fixed infrastructure, which requires that the 
beneficiary own the land in question (which also in effect excludes the many farmers in the 
former Ciskei and Transkei regions). The bulk of funds go to a relatively small number of 
land reform beneficiaries on commercial farms, yet in the Eastern Cape, agricultural officials 
argue that the priority should be fencing and water systems in former Transkei, as these are 
the most severe infrastructure needs. 
We have been fighting it, [the] 70% to land reform beneficiaries, but they are 
relaxing from that. Because we are saying our biggest need is in the former 
Transkei [i.e. communal] areas. But because we don’t have any other funding, we 
use the CASP … OR Tambo [district] gets a very small part of CASP because very 
little of it is commercial farmland, so they fall within the 30% part — also 
Amathole, Alfred Nzo, Chris Hani — they have no land reform land. The 
proportion (of farmers getting CASP support) is much higher among land reform 
beneficiaries [than it is among farmers in the communal areas]. 
Provincial Agriculture manager 2009: pers. comm. 
Similarly, those getting leases on state-owned land through the proactive land acquisition 
strategy (PLAS) in the Eastern Cape have found it to be incompatible with the requirements 
of MAFISA, in that MAFISA requires that, for a standard five-year loan, the applicant must 
have security of tenure for five years — whereas under the PLAS scheme, the farmer only 
gets a lease agreement for three years, so their applications are rejected. As a result, a 
number of people have been allocated land through PLAS but are unable to buy livestock as 
they are not eligible for state support (either MAFISA loans or CASP grants) because they 
are considered to have inadequate tenure for collateral purposes (Provincial Agriculture 
manager 2009: pers. comm.). 
 
The option of providing ‘off-farm’ infrastructure in communal areas — i.e. infrastructure 
that can serve a community or group of producers engaged in similar production in a given 
area — is the obvious way around the obstacle of insecure tenure (if indeed it is an 
obstacle). However, it appears that there is no mechanism for agricultural officials to create 
such infrastructure in the absence of a ‘business plan’ submitted by an ‘applicant’. This is 
frequently presented as a reason why this avenue has not been more actively explored, 
though in reality CASP applications are often initiated by officials, following land transfers 
under land reform, rather than by ‘farmers’. 
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4.2 ‘Commercial viability’: The presumed criterion 
 
Though the criterion of ‘commercial viability’ appears nowhere in the CASP policy (which 
focuses instead on sustainability), implementers in these two provinces prioritise this factor 
consistently — in fact express it as an essential precondition for allocation of CASP funds.  
At this stage, there are still some debates, what in actual fact we should call the 
sustainability or the viability of projects. This is a debate of the department every 
year, but we take time to come up with a final approach. It has been there in this 
team that has been identified, it will deal with the issues of, if you say there is 
viability in the project, what do you mean? Like if there is a turnover of half a 
million, or if the project is servicing its debts — so we are deciding what will be our 
indicator … [and it should be] not high profit margin, but the ability of these guys 
monthly to service their debts. But we don’t have that guideline as yet, but that 
[once we’ve clarified this] will help us and serve as our indicators for good 
performance or non-performance. 
CASP Manager, Limpopo 2009: pers. comm. 
As a result, CASP has become bifurcated between food security for farmers in communal 
areas and infrastructure for farmers in the commercial farming districts. In Limpopo, all 
‘food security’ and ‘animal health’ allocations were for communal areas, while 92% of 
‘infrastructure’ allocations were for land reform projects outside these areas. LRAD is not 
considered ‘food security’; as the Limpopo manager observed, ‘10% of our budget is for 
food security, and that 10% will normally go to the small-scale farmers in the communal 
land. Because you cannot say that the budget for food security should go to LRAD and the 
like’ (CASP Manager, Limpopo 2009: pers. comm.). The presumption that land reform is a 
sphere of potential ‘commercial viability’ while communal areas are for ‘food security’ is put 
forward by agricultural officials as a rationale for prioritising the former. They acknowledge 
that their own criteria for assessing business plans set ‘commercial viability’ as a 
precondition for approving funds. 
It is not a very good formula that is written down, but each year, we look at how 
much land has been transferred [through land reform], and what the requirements 
are, and what the market is, which talks to our principles of development — which 
is a commodity and value chain approach and the like. 
CASP Manager, Limpopo 2009: pers. comm. 
4.3 Handing out ‘political Smarties’: Rationing scarce 
resources 
 
The land redistribution process, since its inception (and at least up to the creation of the 
proactive land acquisition strategy), was structured around a central concern to ration 
resources according to a defined logic — initially providing grants at a level pegged to the 
housing subsidy (at R15,000, later rising to R16,000) and then extending across a sliding scale 
from R20,000 to R100,000 per applicant, depending on the level of ‘own contribution’).  
 
CASP, however, places no restriction or cap on the maximum amount of public support a 
person or project can receive. In Limpopo, an implementer acknowledged that, with no 
guidelines whatsoever governing the distribution of resources: ‘We have recently seen a lot 
of abuse of that leniency.’ They went on to comment that ‘at present we have no guidelines 
for funding; if there is a request that is for a business that is sound, it has markets, it is 
within the plans for CASP, then we will fund it’ (CASP Manager, Limpopo 2009: pers. 
comm.). 
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In the absence of any prescription about equity, agricultural officials are subject to 
institutional pressures to crowd in resources rather than distribute these widely. As an 
agricultural department manager in the Eastern Cape observed, there are good reasons why 
fewer projects — which may or may not involve fewer people — are preferable from a 
bureaucratic point of view.  
The model we’re following is totally inappropriate in the sense that … because the 
amount we fund is so small, it becomes a case of political Smarties rather than 
effective use of resources. Who gets the money in the end is either a lotto or a case 
of political connections. If our budget were to increase to R550 million a year and 
if we reduce the funding level to 60% [of costs, by leveraging private resources], it 
would still take us 100 years [to make up the funding backlog for infrastructure]. 
What we’re spending on infrastructure is less than a drop in the ocean … The 
impact on agriculture is negligible. 
Provincial Agriculture manager, Eastern Cape 2009: pers. comm. 
Combined with the imperative to spend large budgets, and the complexity of doing so 
through many smaller projects rather than fewer bigger projects, implementers are under 
pressure to scale down the number of projects and scale up the size of each project.  
There’s no cap on individuals — they can get anything from R20,000 up to R9 
million — there are no guidelines. We got a lot of flack for that. We have had 
about 120–130 projects in the E. Cape, so the policy being pushed from national is 
to cut down projects, maybe to just 6 for the province, or 1 per municipality, in 
order to speed up administration. To administer R10 is as much as to administer R10 
million, so we are meant to do fewer, bigger projects. The more projects you have, 
the more work you have. 
Provincial Agriculture manager 2009: pers. comm. 
The Eastern Cape tried to follow a strategy adopted in the Western Cape, of outsourcing 
CASP distribution to a private sector implementing agent, to circumvent the need for tender 
committees and short-circuit procurement processes — but has had to abandon this after a 
critical response from the provincial auditors: 
We are trying to do something for which government is not designed. 
Procurement systems are not for service delivery; they’re there to account for 
public funds. For every rand [of CASP money], it costs at least three times more to 
spend it properly. 
Provincial Agriculture manager, Eastern Cape 2009: pers. comm.). 
The tendency in some provinces then to disburse large amounts to few projects (and people) 
may have to do with these pressures, but also, crucially, lends the system open to abuse in 
the form of political patronage and corruption. In the absence of any rationing mechanism 
— or any limit on allocations — CASP also fails to leverage resources in major commercial 
projects (where beneficiaries may be able to contribute some of their own capital and to 
access loans), while neglecting modest needs among the majority of small farmers. Given 
the limited funds available for small farmers, a major criticism then is not only one of equity, 
but one of leveraging resources. Under CASP, government is offering up to 100% grants to 
commercial ventures — rather than providing partial subsidies and leveraging commercial 
farmers’ own resources — while often providing 0% to subsistence producers: 
The way we are doing CASP, we need our heads read as a country. First, we are 
funding things 100%, which in most cases is completely inappropriate. … That’s a 
paradigm we’ve got to change, for one. 
(Provincial Agriculture manager, Eastern Cape 2009: pers. comm. 
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5. Conclusion 
Despite the strong political and policy support for small-scale farmers in South Africa, and 
despite significant increases in agricultural budgets over the past decade or so, the support 
currently rendered to small-scale farmers in South Africa is not consistent with the visions 
espoused in political and policy statements. This paper has sought to understand why, in 
part by examining national expenditure trends, and in part by focusing on one particular 
intervention, namely the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). 
 
We conclude that dramatic increases in public expenditure support to small-scale agriculture 
are highly unlikely, while further incremental increases to support the sector will in 
themselves make little difference. The inadequacy of the current support measures to small-
scale farmers is most vividly illustrated by the fact that only a very small portion of small 
black farmers in South Africa in fact benefit from such support in a typical year — about 
13% by our estimate. Is this a case of simply too little money being allocated to the sector? 
To some extent, yes: even though there have been significant increases, these are relative to 
the low base established by the massive withdrawal of public funding for agriculture in the 
mid-1980s.  
 
CASP expenditure has grown in leaps and bounds, and now represents the bulk of funding 
that is explicitly available for capital expenditure to support small-scale farmers. However, 
our paper demonstrates how the overall ‘footprint’ of CASP has shrunk in proportion to the 
rise in its budget, and even in nominal terms, fewer people are benefiting than when CASP 
started. The reason has to do with political pressure to produce commercial success stories in 
land reform, combined with the bureaucratic impetus to spend ever-larger doses of CASP 
support on ever-smaller numbers of farmers. This process exactly mirrors the trends in 
respect of land redistribution, to which CASP is closely related. While it might appear 
perverse, the pattern is also understandable: subjected to harsh criticism for under-
expenditure, implementers have found the path of least resistance.  
  
Our analysis shows that the primary constraint in state support to small-scale farmers is not 
the level of budget, but the misallocation of funds. Instead of 2.7 million ‘average black 
farming households’ receiving R2,200 worth of benefits per year, our data suggests instead 
that each year: 
• anywhere between 50 and 200 households are receiving over R500,000 each (largely 
in the form of CASP support), 
• about 350,000 are receiving R17,000 (in the form of extension advice and other 
services), while 
• 2.3 million households are receiving close to R0. 
 
As a result, a lot of the money already available to support small-scale agriculture is not well 
spent, with a particular imbalance evident between relatively large amounts of support to 
rather few ‘new farmers’ in badly conceptualised land reform projects, at the expense of the 
many existing black farmers in the ex-Bantustans. 
  
The reality is that supporting small-scale farmers is difficult and labour-intensive. While 
there is definitely a need for increased capital expenditure, doing this well requires 
attention to equity in distributing scarce funds, as well as time, cogent planning, and 
perhaps more patience. On the other hand, the fact that CASP is dependent on extension 
services, while extension services reach too small a share of small-scale farmers, means that 
CASP is almost structurally unable to reach large numbers of small-scale farmers. And yet, 
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despite absorbing a very large share of provincial agricultural expenditure, extension 
reaches limited numbers of agriculturalists — and the quality of extension advice is also 
uneven and reportedly poor in some cases. Doubling the extension corps would still result in 
an inadequate extension corps, reaching only a minority of agriculturalists, and it would 
cost more than the State is probably prepared to commit.  
 
The conclusion therefore is that we are presently at an impasse. Increasing CASP budgets 
will accomplish little, because the vision of CASP is: 
• excessively oriented to supporting individual farmers, 
• excessively channelled into land reform projects (which needs a dramatic design 
overhaul, in the absence of which CASP support to them will continue to be a case 
of ‘throwing good money after bad’), and 
• dependent on an extension service that is itself equipped to serve only few small-
scale farmers and cannot be feasibly scaled up. 
  
The only way out of the impasse would appear to be to use existing resources more 
effectively. In respect of CASP, there is an urgent need to shift the emphasis of support from 
on-farm infrastructure and inputs, to community-level infrastructure, market development 
and institutional re-engineering. The current model of funding, which focuses on one-on-
one assistance at ‘project’ level, has limited impact, cannot feasibly be scaled up, and does 
not lend itself towards indivisible public goods and regulation, which are effective ways of 
benefiting large numbers of producers, and which are among the key forms of support used  
in the past to develop the white farming sector. As for refashioning extension services, this 
is the larger challenge: it will require above all experimenting with models that have the 
potential to greatly stretch the reach of our limited number of extension officers.  
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